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Metals or Management? Explaining Africa's Recent
Economic Growth Performance
By Laura

and Lisa D. Cook*

N. Beny

for Africa's poor long-run
Explanations
growth performance have varied over time.The
theories examined include geography (Jeffrey
D. Sachs and Andrew Warner 1997); institu
tions (William Easterly and Ross Levine 1997;
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James
Robinson 2001, 2002; Nathan Nunn 2007,
2008); health (David Bloom and Sachs 1998;
Gregory N. Price 2003); and economic depen
dency (William Darity 1982). More recently,
economists have attempted to explain what The
Economist has called Africa's new "period of
unparalleled economic success" (The Economist
2008a, 33). Average annual real GDP growth
was 1.8 percent between 1980 and 1989 and
increased to 4.4 percent between 2000 and
2005. Per head, real growth inAfrica fell by 1.1
percent between 1980 and 1989 and increased
2.1 percent between 2000 and 2005 (World
Bank 2007a). This recent reversal of fortune
may stem from thebroad economic reforms that
many African countries instituted during the
1990s,

especially

macroeconomic

stabilization

and financial-market liberalization. But itmay
also be due to the recent boom in international
prices

of oil,

copper,

and

other

primary

com

modities that constitute a significant fraction of
Africa's exports (InternationalMonetary Fund

(IMF) 2006).

*
Beny: University of Michigan Law School, 625 South
State St., Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
(e-mail: lbeny@
and James
umich.edu); Cook: Department of Economics
Madison College, Michigan State University, 110Marshall
Adams Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824 (e-mail: lisacook@
msu.edu). They are grateful to Brahima Coulibaly, William
in seminars at
Darity, Jr., Peter Henry, and participants

With newly available data extending through
2005,l we investigatewhether international com
modity price increases (our "metals" hypothesis)
or policy reforms (our "management" hypoth
esis) have driven Africa's recent performance.
In doing so, we supplement existing accounts
of Africa's recent success (see Benno J.Ndulu
and Stephen A. O'Connell
2007; John Page
and Jorge S. Arbache 2008, for example).2 Our
based

results,
sions,

suggest

on

cross-country
growth
that both
and
"metals"

agement" have contributed to Africa's
reversal

of economic

regres
"man

recent

fortune.

The article proceeds as follows. Section I
briefly describes our data and methodology.
Section II presents the results, and Section III
concludes.

I. Data and Methodology
Data on growth in output per capita and other
country-level characteristics for 239 countries
are available for the period 1960 to 2005 in the
Indicators
World Bank Africa Development
and World Development
Indicators
(ADI)
(WDI) (World Bank 2007a, b). We supplement
these data with country-level data from other
sources. It is possible to use theADI and WDI
to explore changes in growth performance in
African countries before and after the signifi
cant policy and commodity-export changes in
the 1990s.We expect both good policy and luck
to covary with higher rates of economic growth.

1
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assistance.
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data include theWorld

Bank ADI

(World Bank

2007a).
2
A shortcoming of these accounts is that, while they
are somewhat informative with respect to the type of eco
that is correlated with Africa's recent
nomic management
economic performance,
they are less informative about

the type of exports and international trade underlying such
performance. We address this shortcoming by accounting
for both export composition and policy in our analyses of
African growth.
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In particular, we estimate OLS difference-in
differences panel models of the form:
(1)

Ayit

=

(2)

Ayit

=

x Year 1995it+ ^^management

cx0+ ixAfricax + ^Africa

x Africa x Fear 1995

x Year 1995it -f-y3metals Africa

x managementx(q + Xit?

x Year 1995 x metals^
+ Xit? +

at+?it,

where Ayit is the half-decadal moving aver
age growth of GDP per capita for country i in
year t, ?t is a year dummy, and eit is a random
error term.3The elements of X are controls for
and
demand and supply of exports?export
from
GDP
growth
trade-partner trade-weighted
Vivek Arora and Athanasios Vamvakidis (2005);
the dependency ratio (a demographic factor and
measure of labor productivity);4 latitude5 from
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations
Internationales (CEPII) (2008); an Africa indi
cator (from the United Nations Commodity
Trade Statistics Database 2008); year dummies
(1960 is the excluded year); and initial income.
To test the "metals" hypothesis, metals
includes each of the following alternative trade
measures: agricultural exports as a fraction of
GDP; ore and mineral exports as a fraction of
GDP; petroleum and petroleum exports as a
fraction of GDP; and the barter terms of trade.
We also estimate OLS difference-in-differences
panel models of the form:

with similar results. Alternative tests, e.g., first-differenc
least squares (cross-sectional
time
ing and generalized
series), were also implemented to control for persistence
in the data and fixed country effects. The results presented
in this article are consistent with those using alternative
specifications.
4
Other demographic factors, such as life expectancy and
labor force participation, were used in tests not reported
here. The inclusion of one set of demographic controls or

another does not affect the results.
5
Due to space constraints, the reported results exclude
latitude. However, the results are generally the same whether
we include or exclude latitude from the regressions.

6t+

+

eit.

To test the "management" hypothesis, matt
agement includes each of the following alter
native measures
of macroeconomic
policy
and institutional quality:6 final government
consumption as a fraction of GDP; the rate of
inflation (GDP deflator); the black market pre
mium calculated from end-of-year official and
black-market exchange rates (from Carmen
and
Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff 2005);
the Property Rights Index from the Index of
Economic

& measure

Freedom,

of

the general

quality of economic management and institu
tions, particularly the enforcement of laws.
The coefficients of special interest are those
on the interaction terms, represented by ? in
equation (1) and rj in equation (2), which mea
sure the differential impact of "metals" and
on

"management"

economic

growth

between

African and non-African countries from 1995.
II.

Results

The regressions in Table 1 test our "metals"
hypothesis by including commodity and trade
variables. All columns present OLS difference
in-differences

3
We build on the cross-country growth regression anal
yses of Robert J. Barro (1991), Sachs and Warner
(1997),
and Ricardo Hausmann,
Jason Hwang, and Dani Rodrik
Wooldridge
(2007), among others. See Jeffrey
(2002) for an
extensive treatment of difference-in-differences estimation.
While
the regressions presented here include half-decadal
moving averages, models are estimated in the entire sample

a0 + ^Africa-, + ^Africa

estimates.

In column

1, the coef

ficient on the interaction between the Africa
and 1995 dummies is positive and suggests that
after themid-1990s Africa fared relatively bet
ter than the rest of theworld; however, it is not
significant. In column 2, the coefficients on the
petroleum

export

terms

are

negative,

suggestive

of "Dutch disease" (W.Max Corden and J.Peter
Neary 1982), but they are insignificant.7 The
6
On the significance of institutions toAfrica's economic
performance, see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001,

Price (2003),andNunn (2007,2008).
2002),
7

In unreported OLS random effects regressions, we find
that the coefficient on exports of petroleum and related prod
ucts relative to GDP
is negative and significant. However,
in the same regression, the coefficient on the interaction of
this measure
tion of GDP

with exports of goods and services as a frac
is positive and significant. This result suggests
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Table

1?"Metals"

(Commodity Boom) Tests: Difference-in-Differences
(Dependent variable: GDP growth, per capita, 1960-2005)

(i)

Regressor
Dependency

ratio

-4.714***

(1.378)
-0.151

Trade-partner growth,
annual percent

(0.215)

Export growth, annual
percent
Africa dummy

(5)
-5.476***

(0.961)

(0.934)

(1.345)

0.366*

0.101

0.657***

0.005

(0.188)

(0.184)

(0.218)

(0.197)

(1.081)

0.248***

0.201***

0.201***

0.183***

(0.043)

(0.025)

(0.032)

(0.030)

-0.001**

(0.000)

(current USD)
Year = 1995

(4)
-4.356***

0.181***
-1.060*

per capita in 1960,

(3)
?4.191***

(0.030)
(0.610)

GDP

(2)
-4.157***

Regressions

-1.385**

(0.600)

-0.854**

(0.392)
-0.001***

(0.000)
-0.322

(0.566)

Exports, agricultural raw
materials, percent GDP

-1.028***

(0.388)
-0.001***

(0.000)
-1.294**

(0.546)

-0.239

(0.624)
-0.001**

(0.000)
0.151

(0.362)

-0.786**

(0.400)
-0.001***

(0.000)
-1.485***

(0.562)
0.003

(0.012)

Exports, ores and minerals,
percent GDP

-0.018**

(0.008)

Exports, petroleum and
petroleum products, percent GDP
Terms of trade, 2000 = 100

-0.055

(0.045)
-0.008*

(0.005)
Africa dummy x 1995

0.930

(0.580)
Africa dummy x 1995 x petroleum
exports, percent GDP

-0.045

(0.124)

Africa dummy x 1995 x ore
exports, percent GDP
Africa dummy x
trade

0.036*

(0.022)

1995 x terms of

-0.001

(0.006)

Africa dummy x 1995 x
agricultural exports, percent GDP
Observations

0.035***

(0.014)
513

395

472

250

473

Standard errors robust to clustering are reported below estimated coefficients. All models are estimated as difference
in-differences OLS models. Year dummies are included, but only the coefficient for the 1995 year dummy is reported. An
intercept term is also included in estimation but is not reported. Variable definitions and sources are given in text.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*
Significant at the 10 percent level.

Notes:

negative and significant coefficient on ore and
mineral exports relative toGDP in column 3 is
also consistent with Dutch disease. By contrast,
the coefficient on the interaction between ore
and mineral exports and the Africa and 1995

that, while exporting petroleum alone is negatively corre
lated with economic growth (again suggestive of Dutch dis
ease), exporting these products in conjunction with goods
and services, i.e., export diversification, is positively cor
related with economic growth (see, for example, Ndulu and
O'Connell
2007; IMF 2006).

dummies in column 3 are positive and signifi
cant, which supports our "metals" hypothesis
forAfrica. In column 4, the coefficient on the
terms of trade is negative and significant, as
expected, while the coefficient on the interaction
between this variable and theAfrica and 1995
dummies is insignificant.Finally, the regression
in column 5 broadly supports our commodities
boom hypothesis in that the coefficient on the
interaction among 1995, Africa, and agricul
tural exports as a fraction of GDP is positive
and significant. The recent commodities boom
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Table

and Difference-in-Differences
(Policy) Tests: OLS
(Dependent variable: GDP growth, per capita, 1960-2005)

2?"Management"

(i)

Regressor
Dependency

ratio

?4.714***

(1.378)
growth, annual percent

Trade-partner

Export growth, annual percent

-0.151

GDP

(1.007)
0.103

(5)
-2.706

(1.808)
-0.032

(0.214)

(0.234)

0.179***

0.179***

0.226***

0.157***

(0.030)

(0.030)

(0.034)

(0.036)

-0.001**

(0.000)
-1.385**

(0.600)
Government

(1.436)
-0.171

(4)
-5.227***

(0.205)

(0.610)

(current USD)
Year = 1995

379***

0.181***
-1.060*

per capita in 1960,

(1.280)
-0.065

?4

(0.215)
(0.030)

Africa dummy

(3)

(2)
-4.796***

Regressions

spending, percent GDP

-0.967*

(0.552)
-0.000

(0.000)
-0.841

(0.588)

-1.208*

(0.661)
-0.001**

(0.000)
-1.366**

(0.598)

-0.316

(0.604)
-0.001***

(0.000)
-1.476**

(0.692)

(0.230)

-0.784

(0.591)
-0.000

(0.000)
0.685**

(0.313)

-0.095***

(0.036)
Inflation rate

-0.002***

(0.000)
-0.001

Black market premium

(0.002)
0.000

Property rights

(0.017)

Africa dummy x 1995

0.930

(0.580)

Africa dummy x 1995 x government
spending, percent GDP
Africa dummy x

0.089**

(0.038)
0.116***

1995 x inflation rate

(0.038)

Africa dummy x 1995 x black
market premium

0.033***

(0.011)

Africa dummy x 1995 x property
rights
Observations

0.016

(0.012)
513

511

513

353

117

Standard errors robust to clustering are reported below estimated coefficients. All models are estimated as difference
in-differences OLS models. Year dummies are included, but only the coefficient for the 1995 year dummy is reported. An
intercept term is also included in estimation but is not reported. Variable definitions and sources are given in text.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**
Significant at the 5 percent level.
Significant at the 10 percent level.

Notes:

inAfrica affected both petroleum and mineral
and nonpetroleum and nonmineral primary
commodity exports (IMF 2006), so this result
is not surprising.
The regressions presented in Table 2 exam
ine our "management" hypothesis by adding
policy measures. All columns present OLS dif
ference-in-differences regressions. In column
2, while the coefficient on government spend
ing is negative and significant, the coefficient
on the interaction of government spending and
the Africa and 1995 dummies is positive and

significant. This result suggests that after 1995
government spending inAfrica may have aided
in increasing living standards relative to prior
years and other countries, possibly a reflection
ofmore productive spending byAfrican govern
ments, e.g., on health and infrastructure,which
is correlated with productivity and economic
growth (see also Sachs and Warner 1997). In
column 3, the positive and significant coef
ficient on the interaction among inflation and
theAfrica and 1995 dummies likely reflects the
fact thathigher rates of inflationwere correlated
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Table

versus "Management":
Difference-in-Differences
(Dependent variable: GDP growth, per capita, 1960-2005)

3?"Metals"

(i)

Regressor
Dependency

AEA PAPERSAND PROCEEDINGS MAY 2009

ratio

-5.559***

growth, annual

Trade-partner
percent

Export growth, annual percent
Africa dummy

(1.106)

(0.933)

0.045

0.145

(0.195)

(0.179)

(0.862)

(1.006)

0.069

0.170

0.155

(0.181)

(0.205)

(0.200)

0.183***

0.200***

0.221***

0.218***

(0.025)

(0.033)

(0.033)

(0.000)

Government

-0.057**

(0.520)
(0.029)

-1.039***

?0.975***

(0.401)
-0.000**

(0.371)
-0.001***

(0.000)
-0.916*

(0.000)
-1.428**

(0.522)

(0.559)

-1.166***

(0.362)
-0.001***

(0.000)
-1.280**

(0.544)

-0.110

(0.525)
-0.001***

(0.000)
-1.765***

(0.583)

(0.530)
-0.001***

(0.000)
-1.863***

(0.582)

(0.029)

0.090**

0.099***

(0.038)

(0.037)

0.007

0.005

0.000

(0.012)

(0.011)

(0.013)

Africa dummy x 1995
x agricultural exports,
percent GDP

0.007

0.028*5

0.025**

(0.016)

(0.014)

(0.012)

Exports, ores and minerals,
percent GDP

-0.016*

Africa dummy x 1995 x ore
exports, percent GDP

-0.001

-0.016**

(0.008)

Inflation rate

-0.020*

(0.007)

(0.028)
-0.002***

(0.000)
Africa dummy x 1995
x inflation rate

(0.010)

0.026

0.133***

(0.021)

(0.051)

-0.002***

(0.000)

0.093**

0.100**

(0.041)

(0.043)

Black market premium

-0.003

(0.002)
Africa dummy x 1995 x black
market premium

472

-0.227

-0.047

percent GDP

Observations

(1.015)

(0.030)

-1.042**

materials,

(6)
-5.372***

0.199***

(current USD)
Year = 1995

Africa dummy x 1995
x government spending
Exports, agricultural raw

(0.192)

(5)
-5.656***

(0.025)

-0.001**

spending

(1.000)
-0.023

(4)
-4.125***

0.182***
-0.823*

per capita in 1960,

(3)
-5.282***

(0.030)
(0.434)
GDP

(2)
-4.401***

Regressions

471

473

472

-0.003

(0.002)

0.031***

0.032***

(0.011)

(0.011)

335

335

Notes: Standard errors robust to clustering are reported below estimated coefficients. All models are estimated as OLS
models. Year dummies are included, but only the coefficient for the 1995 year dummy is reported. Variable definitions and
sources are given in text.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*
Significant at the 10 percent level.

with economic growth inAfrican countries. In
other words, a greater part of price increases
inAfrica after 1995 may have been the "good"
inflation that accompanies economic growth.
Similarly, the result in column 4 implies that the
impact of the black market premium was more
benign in Africa after 1995 relative to other
countries. Finally, the property rightsmeasures

in column 5 are insignificant,possibly a result of
insufficientobservations.
Table 3 presents results from testing the "met
als"

and

"management"

hypotheses

simultane

ously. Commodity and trade variables include
mineral and ore exports and agricultural exports,
relative to GDP. Policy variables include gov
ernment spending, the inflation rate, and the
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black market premium. In columns
"metals."

dominates

"management"

1 and 2

The

coeffi

cients on the terms interactedwith government
spending positively and significantlycovary with
economic growth,whereas the terms interacted
with mineral and agricultural exports are not sig
nificant at conventional levels. "Management"
and "metals" in column 3 are both significant;
specifically, the coefficients on both the inflation
and agriculture interaction terms are positive
and significant.However, the coefficient on the
former is of largermagnitude than the coefficient
on

the

latter.

In

column

4,

the

"management"

effect clearly dominates the "metals" effect. In
particular, the coefficient on the inflation inter
action term is positive and significant,while the
coefficient on the ore and minerals interaction
term is insignificant (albeit positive).
When considering the black market premium
in columns 5 and 6, neither "metals" nor "man
agement" consistently dominates. The coeffi
cient on the black market premium interaction
term remains positive and significant at the 1
percent level of significance. At the same time,
the coefficients on the interacted commodity
variables are highly significant.For agricultural
exports (column 5), it is less clear which effect
is larger since the coefficients are approximately
the same size. With respect to ore and mineral
exports (column 6), themagnitude of the coeffi
cient on its interaction term is one order ofmag
nitude larger than thaton the premium variable.
Overall, the results in Table 3 are generally
consistent with the findings in the separate
"management"

and

"metals"

regressions.

It

fluctuations

have

is

difficult to conclude decisively whether policy
reforms

or

commodity-price

been more influentialwith respect to Africa's
recent growth spurt.Rather, it seems thatboth
have

mattered.

booms are typically followed by commodity
busts, as demonstrated by the IMF (2006). Ifbet
ter economic management has played any posi
tive role, itmay be critical for protecting gains
in growth outcomes and higher living standards
when commodity prices eventually fall.
While we have been careful to minimize
problems associated with using country-level
data in estimation, we are aware of the limita
tions
as

of cross-country
reverse
causation,

Conclusion

and Future

Research

We have exploited recently available data
on African economic growth to understand
whether policy reform ("management") or
the recent commodity boom ("metals") bet
ter explains Africa's recent growth experience.
Our results suggest that both factors have con
tributed to Africa's recent reversal of fortune.
These findings are broadly consistentwith those
in the related empirical literature.We believe
this study is timely and important.Commodity

such

analysis,

and

multicollinearity,

heterogeneity.8 Given the resulting problems
of interpretation, future research may include
country case studies to circumvent such prob
lems and corroborate our results. Itwould also
be interesting to revisit our "management" and
tests

"metals"

a few years

hence,

the cur

after

rent global financial and economic crises have
evolved and once data are available (see also
The Economist 2008b).
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